One
could almost say we are witnessing the rebirth of Gaullism, with two
small variations. This time it is not about Frances glory but
the glory of western Europe. And it is not so much politicians but intellectuals
who are carrying the banner of a European identity that is defined as
against America. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida agree with
Charles de Gaulle insofar as they find encouragement for their efforts
in the street, in the general ambition of the anti-war demonstrations
of the greater European cities on 15 February 2003.
In
their argument, the two philosophers summon up the support of a colleague,
Emmanuel Kant. They think, says Derrida at the start, in a
framework, if not in a manner that dates back to the Kantian tradition.
Habermas concludes by writing of a Kantian hope in a global
politics.
This
is also a reply to the American neo-conservative Robert Kagan, who,
in his famous pamphlet Power and Weakness, sought
to crown Emmanuel Kant as the philosopher-king of the European Union.
Kant
himself gave philosopher-kings short shrift, because the possession
of power inevitably corrupts the free exercise of reason,
but he has earned his place as the thinker who anticipated the European
Union. But yes! We are Kantian! But in the portraits drawn by Habermas
and Kagan, that of the euro-Gaullist intellectual and that of the American
neo-conservative, each of which confirms the other, one can hardly recognize
the great Enlightenment thinker that was Kant. The Europeans,
writes Kagan, have passed from the world of Hobbesian anarchy
to the Kantian world of perennial peace. The philosopher of
Königsberg could have had no doubt that such was the way others
would interpret the title of his essay, ironically taken from the sign
outside a Dutch inn, Zum ewigen Frieden or to eternal peace,
namely that of the graveyard.
No.
Both authors are confusing Kant with Rousseau. Emmanuel Kant was carved
out of an altogether different wood, much harder than that of the Genevan
who dreamed of Arcadia. Not only did Kant know of power, but he even
thanked nature for incompatibility, for the vanity that competes
jealously, for the insatiable desire to possess and even to dominate.
Only the unsociable sociability of men, or their
multiplicity, faction and antagonism, could make
them emerge from the idyllic Arcadia where, in mutual love,
perfect frugality and harmony, all talent would forever wither in the
bud.
We
are Kantian. Like Kant, we seek an ultimately cosmopolitan society of
citizens, universally administering law, ever imperfect and rife with
conflict but, above all, open. A renewed Europe can contribute considerably
toward this, as America has done for more than two hundred years and
always in new ways.
Furthermore,
there is more to Europe than what Habermas attributes to the present
and future Europeans. At times, his Europe reminds one of West Germany
before 1989. Of course, the experiences of the totalitarian
regimes of the 20th century and the warlike past
recall both executioners and victims. But is religion really so impolitic
in all of Europe? In Ireland? In Poland? In Britain, where Parliament
goes as far as to pray publicly at beginning business? And the
emancipation of civil society from the the tutelage of an absolutist
regime was not a British, Italian or Swiss phenomenon.
Europe
needs renewal. But this cannot be accomplished by attempting the self-determination
of Europe as the un-America, even the anti-America. Every attempt at
defining Europe as against America will not unite Europe but divide
it. This is what the Iraq crisis has shown. Habermas interprets the
demonstrations of 15 February as a unanimous response of the European
peoples to the declarations of loyalty to Bush that
eight heads of state and government, lead by José Maria Aznar
and Tony Blair, had published shortly beforehand.
This
is a false interpretation in three respects: firstly because the demonstrations
were not in fact a reaction to the letter of the eight;
secondly, because this letter, signed by European statesmen who are
as well known for their obsequiousness as Vaclav Havel, was more a recognition
of Western values and transatlantic relations than of George W. Bush;
and thirdly, because the letter was solely born as a reaction to the
isolated Franco-German front formed against a second resolution at the
UN. Thus this attempt at creating an avant-garde core of Europe
did not unite the Continent but divided it.
No.
To the contrary, the driving force behind European renewal must be an
applied Enlightenment politics that unite Europe and America and that
still win over more of the worlds statesmen with their success
and force of conviction. The Kantian hope for world government is the
shining face of globalization. Europes particulars, its efforts
and successes, must be taken into account in this. They can also serve
as a model. We will name a few.
On
1 May, 2004, the European Union will number 25 states. Fifteen long
(too long) years after the first breach in the Iron Curtain, a dream
is being becoming a reality, a dream of unifying Europe, of Europes
salvation, or, as George Bush Senior has said in a more condensed manner,
a Europe that is whole and free. Not yet entirely
whole: many who are part of it remain on the outside for the moment.
But
the clear majority of European states that fought bloody wars in previous
centuries will belong for the first time to a single community of states
equal before the law, politically and economically peaceful. (For external
security, it is for the moment the UN and the Americans who are in charge).
This has never before been the case in Europe. This exists on no other
continent. These states seek also to make a constitutional pact. Hadnt
we rather make May 1 2004, which unites us, rather than 15 February
2003, which divides us, as the date for Europes birth?
Another
of Europes important amenities is linked with its enlargement:
these are the political criteria decided on by the European Council
in Copenhagen in 1993 for candidate nations. These Copenhagen
criteria require above all stable democratic institutions, the
rule of law, the respect of human rights and the protection of minorities.
Additionally, they call for market economies, including independent
central banks. Well beyond the founding treaties, in this the European
Union has become a model for the establishment of freedom, the acceptance
of which it has not hesitated in demanding from candidate nations. Europe
has shown that she is ready to invest actively in favor of a liberal
order.
Europes
welfare states, writes Habermas, were for a long
time models themselves. (It should be noted that this stated
in the past tense). In fact, there were always grand inequalities between
those states that indulged in costly welfare states and those that could
not afford this, including the majority of states of central and eastern
Europe. New Zealand and Canada (and some states in the United States)
are closer to to the European social model than many European
countries. It is however, correct that Europe has developed a wide array
of variants, functioning more or less on democratic capitalism. What
they have in common is that they have sought to accomplish the principal
goal stated by Adair Turner: to unite a dynamic economy and
the liberating action of private enterprise with the ideal of a society
that includes all, while knowing that the free market cannot accomplish
everything.
Such
principles lead us back to Kant. The cosmopolitan point of
view is to act such that our deeds can been taken as the principles
of a cosmopolitan society universally administering the law. The road
to that place may seem long, the goal may seem wholly inaccessible,
but it directs what we are doing and what we are not doing. Neither
all the versions of the European Union that are today contested, nor
all the administrations in Washington have followed these maxims. Nevertheless,
they describe both the Europe and America that we want and their common
goals.
Ralf
Dahrendorf is former rector at the London School of Economics
and was secretary of state under Willy Brandt in Germany and now sits
in the House of Lords in Great Britain. Timothy Garton Ash
is director of the Center for European Studies at Saint Antony's College,
Oxford.
Translated
from the German by Denis Thouard