Françoise
Thom
Translated by Douglas
French original: "Les
choix de la diplomatie française"
(Institut Hayek Institute, 2003/05/06)
The
choices French diplomacy made, by Françoise Thom*
France
has taken being the land of the consensus too far. In no area is this
consensus more visible than that of foreign policy. Yet, in no area
should the choices made by French officials be subjected to greater
scrutiny and debate, given their implications and probable consequences
for the evolution of the country and for that of Europe.
Unfortunately,
this debate is entirely impossible for the French are daily under fire
from a press cemented together by Gallic leftism. They instinctively
feel the dangers to which they are exposed by the attitudes that the
Chirac-Villepin duo has imposed on French diplomacy. They are ill at
ease before the recent upheavals in international order and by Frances
internal evolution but their elected officials, intimidated by the monolithic
thinking percolated through programs and articles, only rarely give
voice to the deaf anxieties experienced by Frances lesser castes.
Of
what has been done, nothing can be repaired. But this is no reason to
persist in our forward flight. The page is turning on the Iraq crisis.
The moment has come to pause and take stock of our recent actions.
To
evaluate a foreign policy, one must ask oneself two questions. The first
is whether this policy favors the realization of the desired objectives.
The second consists in asking whether those objectives correspond to
the real interest of the nation.
The
prime objective of French diplomacy is the unconditional containment
of the United States.
Whatever
the Americans do, France feels it is absolutely necessary to put a stick
between their spokes. The neo-Gaulists think that France will attain
a role worthy of itself in the international scene if it takes the lead
in opposition to the American hyper-power.
Chriacs
France is European because it views Europe as a rival pillar to the
United States and it easily imagines itself in an hegemonic position
in this anti-American Europe.
Chiracs
France champions the UN, which general de Gaulle once called a contraption,
because it thinks its seat on the Security Council is a privileged instrument
for the containment of the United States while bestowing a certain gravity
upon France in the international community, to which neither its economic
successes nor its cultural importance permit it to lay claim.
And
therefore the goals that Chiracs foreign policy has set for itself
are the struggle against American unilateralism, the transformation
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy from a statement of intentions
to an institutional reality and the elevation of France to the status
of a power whose voice is heard on the global stage.
In
every one of these aims, France has obtained results that are the opposite
of those it had been pursuing.
French
obstructionism in the United Nations, the tour of 14 capitals taken
by the minister of foreign affairs in the hope of preventing the use
of force against Saddam, taken together with less recent snubs, such
as Libyas election to the presidency of the Human Rights Commission,
further accentuated the already pronounced penchant of the American
administration for unilateralism. More than ever, the United States
are losing interest in the UN. Yet past experience shows that without
American power, the UN is only a formal entity. So the French attitude
has sabotaged the United Nations, while Paris claimed to be strengthening
it.
Furthermore,
stalwart French efforts to undermine NATO seem to have borne fruit after
the Franco-German refusal of to give the alliances military assistance
to Turkey. Yet again, French behavior succeeded only in heightening
the Bush administrations already marked tendency toward unilateralism.
Now
lets examine the fruits of Chiracs diplomacy in Europe.
In
reading an account of the numerous debates that animated the the European
convention, one gets the impression that Europeans are united on one
point only: the necessity to contain Frances ambitions.
Paris
has harbored the delusion that it is resurrecting the Franco-German
duo. One has only to read the German press to realize that on the other
side of the Rhine we are much despised for having exploited a difficult
moment for Germany, the isolation in which Berlin found itself following
an electoral campaign that resorted to anti-Americanism. Germany is
frightened by French extravagance.
No
one really knows what is pushing Chirac to oppose the United States
to such a degree. This can only worry us. It is a frightening situation,
Michael Glos said recently. He is a member of parliament from the CSU.
(For the German attitude, see the article by Thibaut de Champris in
Le Figaro of 28 March 2003).
Germany
is struggling to persuade Washington that it does not share the French
vision of a Europe opposed to the United States. When the CDU returns
to power, France will pay the bill for the concessions it exacted last
autumn.
The
rebirth of the Franco-German duo has also aroused grave doubts among
the nations of central and eastern Europe who are candidate nations
for European enlargement and who, since the Nice summit, had been counting
on Germany to counterbalance Paris hegemonic tendencies: these
apprehensions were aggravated yet again by the crude diatribes of the
French president, leaving it to be understood that the price of admission
to the EU was total submission to the French view of an anti-American
Europe.
Since
the Paris-Berlin axis was completed by an understanding with Moscow,
we can understand why the nations of the former Communist bloc wondered
if it were really worth the trouble of joining a Europe where all the
slogans of the bygone Soviet era (the struggle for peace, the struggle
against Zionism, against imperialism, social benefits) have returned
in force.
The
dust-up with London compromises the second project which is dear to
French officials: the construction of a European army. Without Franco-British
collaboration there can be no European army worthy of the name. There
again, Paris anti-Atlanticist orientation has not only nipped
in the bud the attempt to put European defense on its feet, but it considerably
weakened Tony Blair, the most pro-European of British leaders. Nothing
better serves the aims of the Europhobes on the other side of the Atlantic
than the fracas of French diplomacy.
In
brief, wherever it turned, France got the opposite of what it sought.
It
wanted a united, anti-American Europe and succeeded in dividing the
continent more seriously than it had ever been before.
It
had hoped to be the leader to this Europe and found itself isolated
opposite an organized coalition of European states. It relations with
Britain are moribund and contentious with its Latin sisters, with the
dubious support of a hesitant Germany and a Russia that is more than
ever given to double-gaming.
It
has earned the dangerous enmity of America without having covered its
rear-guard.
Strictly
from the point of the goals France claimed to be attaining, Chiracs
diplomacy is an overwhelming fiasco.
Now
for the fundamental point, namely: to what degree does the attitude
of French diplomacy correspond to the real interests of our country.
In
its foreign policy, France has in a way put on the boots of the defunct
Soviet Union:
*
same obstructionist policy at the UN,
* same third-world-ist demagoguery,
* same alliance with the Arab world,
* same ambition to take the lead in a coalition of anti-imperialist
states against Washington.
France
has resurrected Primakovs old Eurasian master plan, which consisted
in creating a Paris-Berlin-Moscow-Beijing axis against the Anglo-Saxons,
a goal in which Putins Russia no longer believes but in which
it encourages Paris because Russia sees it as a way of improving its
position in negotiating with Washington.
The
anti-American obsession means that France is less than inquisitive as
to the nature of regimes to which it lends its support in the name of
multipolarity. Iraq, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Sudan: in a word, France seems
to get on better with the rogue states and failed states than with the
United States whose civilization it shares. It claims to defend international
law by leaning on states that ignore all laws.
The
comparison to the Soviet Union goes further than it may seem. Indeed,
French diplomacy is less inspired by a cynical Realpolitik (whence the
failures mentioned above) than by an ideological view of the world.
Its anti-Americanism is the projection of its internal jacobinism onto
the global stage. The unhealthy French communion in anti-Americanism
reveals the start of a drift towards totalitarianism in our country,
which was already noticeable by the second round of the elections: Bush
has replaced Le Pen in the role of enemy of the people. Anti-Bushism
can be compared to the anti-fascism of the 30s and
40s: it conceals an obligatory communist-type consensus.
Like
those in the USSR of Brezhnev, French leaders compensate with a ruinous
foreign activism for their inability to begin crucial internal reforms,
which are impossible because they would call into question the socialist
dogma at the foundation of the French state. In both cases, foreign
activism both accelerates and accentuates the internal crisis. We saw
what became of the Soviet Union.
In
France, the evidence of the decay of the state has been mounting for
two years and the Iraq matter acted to reveal this.
French
leaders have sought to justify their position on the question of Iraq
by emphasizing that France rejected the clash of civilizations
and consequently favored the integration of French Muslims.
True,
president Chirac was hailed in the Arab quarters. But the official anti-Americanism
has favored the explosive mixture of a virulent Trotskyite movement,
an Islamist movement, an anti-Globalization movement and a third-world-ist
movement. This poisonous cocktail feeds not only the youths of the Arab
neighborhoods but the high school students sent out to demonstrate for
peace by their leftist teachers in the name of activism.
In this sense, the orientations of French diplomacy only reflect the
strident third-world-ization of France, starting with the third-world-ization
of minds. President Chirac defies Bush but gives in before to the ghettos.
In
a telling way, Dominique de Villepin told parliament that the French
position was to bring about the failure of anglo-Saxon liberalism.
Like most of their Arab interlocutors, French leaders feel the need
is more urgent to stand up to the United States, even when they are
right, than to start down the path of reforms which could save the state
from bankruptcy.
The
most serious part of all this is that anti-American passion has numbed
the French to the consequences of this deliberate break with the Western
camp.
Consequences
which were already perceptible in the excesses of the peace demonstrations,
in the fact that the French state is less and less able to guarantee
the security of goods and persons, starting with that of our Jewish
fellow citizens. In the media, the view of the first days of the war
in Iraq, often as overtly pro-Saddam propaganda, was clearly irresponsible,
to the point of alarming officials with the Ministry of the Interior:
according to one of them:
The
depiction of the coalitions shambles in Iraq is in some areas
feeding a form of arrogance which the police on the ground are now witnessing...
Just a spark and the anti-Americanism of the ghettos will feed uncontrollable
violence (Le Figaro 3 April, 2003).
Foreign
observers wonder at the causes of French madness.
At
the moment when the fragility of the French state is becoming visible
to all, in the absence of any credible European defense, is it really
wise to break with our American ally, to the point that it now views
us as an enemy? Even Russia has understood that it has an interest in
not stirring things up with America, precisely because of its own internal
weaknesses. Russia remains anti-America at bottom but it is keeping
a low profile, happy to see France be the lightning rod for Washington
and this strategy is paying off: the American media, for which
no word is too harsh in condemning France, find every excuse for Putin.
The
first explanation for the behavior of our leaders is irresponsibility
they believe that they will not have to answer to anyone.
This
irresponsibility is driven so far that they seem to be surprised at
the consequences of their acts: thus they were not expecting the flare-up
of francophobia in the United States, convinced they could persist in
their provocations of Washington without risking retaliation. The habit
of impunity in internal politics ended up giving rise to a disastrous
foreign policy, as was exactly the case for the late USSR.
In
the case of France, one must add futility and vanity, permanent factors
in our diplomacy.
Chiracs
foreign policy is due in part to the anxiety of the political class
before the increasingly obvious failure of republican integration.
Rather than face the danger, we take refuge in denial.
We
declare that France does not believe in the clash of civilizations,
as if denial were enough to erase it. For greater security, we go as
far as abolishing the idea of civilization. This is why we seek to deny
at all costs the fact that France shares the same civilization as the
United States, by cultivating with some fanfare our overflow into extra-legal
zones. Anti-Americanism plays a central role in this mechanism.
Our
foreign policy thus expresses a sort of preemptive capitulation. France
takes the initiative of breaking with the Western camp in the hope of
avoiding a battle of wills with its wild and fanatical youth after having
failed to tame it. This profound cowardice is hidden behind the exhibited
panache of a little country that oppose a big one. The myth of Asterix
hides a decidedly more sordid reality. Anti-Americanism makes possible
this fraud and the continuance of a policy that risks making us ill
beyond repair and sinking all of Europe with us.
* Senior lecturer at Paris-IV Sorbonne
©
Françoise Thom et upjf.org